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the increase in punishment severity generated by the Penal Code can reduce the number 
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commit homicide could reduce juvenile’s engagement in a criminal career associated 
with gangs and generate gains in social well-being. 
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Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world and much of the violent criminality 
can be linked to guns and drug trafficking operations by organized crime groups (Carvalho and 
Soares, 2016). This link is more prominent in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro where the 
illicit retail drug market is dominated almost exclusively by three criminal organizations called 
Comando Vermelho, Terceiro Comando and Amigos dos Amigos.  
Such drug trafficking gangs, which formed within the Brazilian penitentiary system, recruit 
gang members who gradually perform more important roles in their careers. They start out as 
lookouts or local transporters, after that, they can become sellers or soldiers and, at the top of 
their career, they can be appointed managers. Drug trafficking gang members earn on a 
commission basis or are paid a monthly or weekly salary according to their role in the 
organization, so they can progress on a criminal career path. Their recruitment process starts at 
early ages and many of them are juveniles (Silva and Urani, 2002; Dowdney, 2003; Carvalho 
and Soares, 2016).1 
Gang association comes with a price and young gang members suffer a great deal of the 
violence involved in drug trafficking activities. Carvalho and Soares (2016) reported that 20% 
of their sample, composed of members of drug-trafficking gangs in the favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro, had been murdered at two years after the first interview. A similar situation can be 
observed in other cities of the country. Nearly four in every 1,000 Brazilian adolescents living 
in the country’s biggest cities are murdered before the age of 19, making Brazil not only the 
world’s most homicidal country but also one of the countries with the highest levels of lethal 
violence against children and adolescents (Waiselfisz, 2017). 
The recruitment of juveniles by organized crime occurs in many other places in the world 
(Comunale et al., 2020). Numerous studies have sought to understand the causes of youth 
engagement in such organizations. Literature on juveniles’ recruitment for criminal activities 
has focused basically on three factors as potential explanations: social, psychological and 
economic. Ostrosky et al. (2012) argue that juveniles are attracted by lifestyles dominated by 
the cult of violence and by the experience of owning material goods. The likelihood of being 
recruited at younger ages is also positively associated with problems at school, drug use, low 
socio-economic conditions and a lack of prospects (Silva and Urani, 2002; Arsovska, 2015; 
Carvalho and Soares, 2016). In this regard, growing up in a poor neighborhood in a socio-
economically deprived environment facilitates recruitment into drug trafficking gangs 
(Carvalho and Soares, 2016; Decker and Chapman, 2008; Sergi, 2016; Van San and Sikkens, 
2017). Other studies show that family ties are facilitators to access criminal careers, since family 
members and close friends are easier to trust in the criminal environment where there are no 
third parties to regulate disputes (Arsovska, 2015; Salinas et al., 2011; Sergi, 2016; Van 
Koppen, 2013). Substance abuse, childhood conduct disorder and some psychopathological 
traits, such as a lack of empathy and cruelty, have been related with an increase in juveniles’ 
                                                          
1 Carvalho and Soares (2016) estimated that 6.5% of men aged 10 to 25 living in the favelas were members of 
drug trafficking gangs in the city of Rio de Janeiro (the capital of the state with the same name). 




likelihood of involvement in criminal activities. Such profiles are compatible with risky and 
violent activities like the drug trafficking business (Ostrosky et al., 2012).  
In this article we examine a further factor that could explain the recruitment of juveniles by 
criminal organizations and the environment of violence; reaching the age of penal majority. We 
argue that the lenient Brazilian Penal Code encourages recruitment of juveniles by drug 
trafficking gangs. Our hypothesis is that drug trafficking-related crimes committed by juveniles 
are significantly reduced when they reach the age of majority and face more severe 
punishments. We use a quasi-experiment generated by the age of criminal responsibility to 
evaluate the impacts that punishment severity has on crimes in the vicinity of adulthood. 
To achieve this, we gathered detailed information on all arrests made in 2016 and in the first 
half of 2017 in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro. We address two important issues when we 
process this crime data: aggregation bias and the possible existence of incapacitation effects. 
First, instead of using aggregated crimes types (including crimes types with different severity 
of punishment) we focus on two crimes that can be largely related to Rio de Janeiro’s criminal 
organizations: drug trafficking and homicides. Importantly for us, both types of crime have 
predicted and real differences regarding punishment severity for minors and for those over 18 
years of age in Brazil.2 
Second, instead of focusing on recidivism,3 we evaluate the deterrence effects of differences 
in the severity of punishment on the total number of crimes per age. This way, we avoid the 
censorship problem in the observed sample of offenders. This problem arises when recidivism 
is used as an outcome variable, since many individuals do not reoffend due to the incapacitation 
effects of applied punishments.4 Therefore, we adopt three strategies that produce very robust 
results. First, we consider each crime an independent occurrence (independent of who 
perpetrated it) to compute the total number of crimes per age. Second, we consider each crime 
an independent occurrence for minors while for adults we consider only the first appearance in 
the dataset. This option is selected because at 18 years of age all Brazilians are considered first-
time defendants so all previous criminal records as minors are erased. Hence, all individuals 
start adulthood with no previous records. If they are arrested for an offense, it can be considered 
the “first crime” of adult life.5 Finally, we only consider arrest data for individuals when they 
appear for the first time in our data set. The results are robust and very consistent for the three 
options to compute our outcome variable.  
The deterrence effects of criminal law at early stages are important to evaluate because many 
authors, such as Bell et al. (2018), have highlighted the significance of the first crime to 
determine criminal careers. These authors argued that earlier experiences of crime can increase 
juveniles’ stock of criminal knowledge and potentially reduce the costs of subsequent crime 
                                                          
2 In the appendix we show as a placebo exercise that for crimes such as thefts, assaults and threats, for which 
differences in punishment severity are not as great or are inexistent, there are no statistically significant differences 
in total crimes per age in the vicinity of 18 years old.  
3 If recidivism is used as an outcome variable, individuals will be excluded from the sample because they are 
serving a sentence or waiting for a prison sentence (see Arora 2019; Loeffler and Grunwald, 2015). 
4 For the case of youngsters (17–19) arrested for homicides (including attempts to commit homicide and homicide), 
37% of our sample were repeat offenders. Note that this reoffending percentage comes mostly from attempts to 
commit homicide at 42%, compared to 14% of those that committed homicide. In the case of drug trafficking 
crimes, the average reoffending probability was 27% for individuals aged 17–19. 
5 By restricting the data set to the first crime as adults we also abstract from incentives to reoffend as adults that 
could vary due to the Penal Code.  




participation. In addition, a first criminal record can reduce the adult’s expected wage in the 
legal labor market. Both effects would increase the likelihood of an individual ending up 
becoming a career criminal, and once he or she starts a criminal career, the chances of leaving 
it are very small. 
Our main results show that the increase in punishment severity generated by the Brazilian 
Penal Code can reduce the number of drug trafficking crimes and homicides committed by 
youngsters by 9% and 37%, respectively. Therefore, as long as these crime types can be 
attributed to gang activity, harsher punishment can inhibit recruitment and, consequently, the 
participation of juveniles in jobs related to drug trafficking gangs such as dealers and soldiers.  
The remainder of this article is organized into five sections. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature about deterrence effects of punishment severity. Section 3 presents the 
institutional background that generates a significant change in punishment severity for the 
crimes of drug trafficking and homicide in Brazil. Section 4 describes the database and the 
methodology used, Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 presents the main conclusions 
of this study. 
 
2. Deterrence effects of punishment severity: a literature review 
 
The seminal work of Becker (1968) presented a simple decision-making model in which 
potential criminals respond rationally and consistently to incentives. In this model, crime arises 
in a decision-making process by rational agents who maximize the expected utility of crime. 
On the one hand, they consider the psychological and monetary benefits of crime. On the other 
hand, they consider its costs, measured by the likelihood of there being some punishment and 
by the monetary equivalent of the severity of the punishment. Given that in the model the agents 
have no income restrictions, any combination of punishment probability and punishment 
severity greater than the benefits of the crimes would be able to deter potential offenders. 
Considering this reasoning, the author concluded that more severe punishments would be more 
efficient because, in general, they have lower costs than the expenditure needed to increase the 
likelihood of punishment. Among other things, this effect would justify the adoption of 
maximum penalties.6 
In terms of deterrence, there is no consensus that the combination of low punishment 
probability with more severe punishments is the best combination to deter potential criminals. 
For example, contrary to what Becker (1968) suggested, Andreoni (1991) argued that the 
severity of the punishment must be proportional to the crime. The author claimed that the 
severity of the punishment and its likelihood are not entirely independent because judges tend 
to apply more severe sentences less often. This distinction occurs because, in the face of more 
severe sentences, judges tend to apply the punishment only when they are absolutely certain of 
                                                          
6 In the same vein, Polinsky and Shavell (1984) showed that punishment in the form of fines is more efficient than 
imprisonment because the public costs of applying this type of punishment are low. Thus, in accordance with 
Becker (1968), the maximum pecuniary fine (the total income of the offender) would be optimal. However, the 
authors draw attention to the fact that this fine could be less than the loss caused by the criminal. Therefore, some 
combination with a period of incarceration would be optimal, as long as the marginal cost of the incarceration is 
not too high. Thus, in theoretical models, incarceration occurs as a complement to pecuniary fines and as an 
alternative to changes in the likelihood of punishment. Of course, this analysis disregards the fact that incarceration 
can also reduce crimes due to effects of incapacitation. 




the defendant’s guilt. Furthermore, Garoupa (1998) argued that severe punishments associated 
with low punishment probability only work under specific conditions. They fail when there are 
social costs in punishing or there is imperfect information regarding punishment probability.7  
Faced with this lack of consensus on the most efficient combination to deter crime, a natural 
path is evaluation through empirical evidence. However, these effects are not easy to separate 
empirically because whenever the severity of the punishment changes, as proposed by Andreoni 
(1991), there is also a change in the likelihood of the punishment. Even when the interest is not 
in separating these effects but in analyzing them together, there are still endogeneity problems 
inherent to any empirical study that uses variations between locations or variations in time to 
identify deterrence effects. These problems are mainly caused by simultaneity, because 
locations and periods of time with greater levels of crime tend to have more severe punishments, 
and by the omission of relevant variables because it is difficult to have controls for all the 
variables that are associated with punishment severity and the number of crimes. For example, 
the behavior of judges regarding punishment established by legislation affects both the number 
of crimes and the willingness of legislators to change legislation on punishments.  
Alternatives found in the empirical literature are the search for natural experiments and 
quasi-experiments. For example, changes in laws and government policies can generate 
exogenous variations that allow the data in the sample to be separated into control and treatment 
groups, so that observational studies can be approximated to controlled experiments. In other 
words, although there are no random samples, research designs are sought to generate selections 
from these groups that are as good as if they were random. In this context, to evaluate the 
impacts that changes in punishment severity have on crimes, the use of both natural experiments 
and quasi-experiments can be seen in the literature.  
Kessler and Levitt (1999) used the natural experiment generated by Proposition 8, which 
was approved in the state of California. This proposition increased the punishment severity for 
reoffending criminals by adding five years for each crime committed previously if it was a 
violent crime and one year for each previous crime if it was non-violent. These new rules were 
applied to the crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, attempted murder with firearms and burglary 
(treatment group). However, the previous legislation was maintained for the crimes of 
attempted homicide without the use of firearms, vehicle theft and other thefts (control group). 
Their results indicated that the treatment group’s crimes plummeted in the first year of the 
proposal due to deterrence effects and continued to fall in subsequent years. According to the 
authors, this result was due to the combination of the effects of incapacitation and dissuasion. 
Helland and Tabarrok (2007) used the quasi-experiment generated by the Three-Strikes Law 
in the state of California. In this law, punishment severity changes abruptly from the second to 
the third strike. Criminals can be divided into two groups: one group of criminals who 
reoffended after the first crime (control group) and the other group of those who reoffended 
after the second crime (treatment group). After analyzing crimes in California, the authors 
concluded that the legislation reduced recidivism by 48% after the first strike and by 12.5% 
after the second strike. In other words, more severe punishments can generate an anticipatory 
effect that reduces crime upon the first strike.  
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the likelihood of punishment used in economics of crime models is that which is perceived 
by the individual, which is not necessarily the true one. Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992) showed that more severe 
punishments are not efficient when individuals have imperfect information about punishment probability. 




Drago et al. (2009) used the natural experiment generated by the Collective Clemency Law 
that was approved by the Italian parliament in July 2006. This law established a reduction of 
three years in the sentences of those convicted. It also determined that, in the case of recidivism, 
criminals must receive the residual punishment for the crime whose sentence had been reduced 
in addition to the sentence imposed by the new crime. Thus, each potential act of recidivism 
would have a different punishment. Using these different punishments as a source of exogenous 
variation, the authors concluded that each month of an additional (residual) sentence reduces 
the likelihood of recidivism by 1.24%. 
Closely related to us, Lee and McCrary (2017) used a quasi-experiment generated for the 
age of criminal responsibility because this legal device generates an increase in punishment 
severity, which also enables a sample to be separated into two groups. The first group would 
consist of minors (control group) who receive softer punishments, while the second group 
would be formed by adults who receive more severe punishments (treatment group). Using a 
longitudinal database that tracked the “criminal career” of various individuals in the state of 
Florida between 1989 and 2002, the authors found a reduction of 2% in recidivism (outcome 
variable) for an increase in punishment estimated at 230%.  
However, the study had some limitations that also appear in related studies. The results were 
severely affected by incapacitation effects. That is, many who were convicted for the first crime 
did not reoffend because they were still serving prison sentences, especially if the first offense 
was serious and consequently severely punished. This is a limitation of every study that uses 
recidivism data and studies that gather data from too short a time interval to recidivate. 
Secondly, the grouping of arrests for crimes with different punishments makes it impossible to 
obtain specific comparative crime statistics, such as how many homicides can be reduced with 
an increase in punishment severity for this crime.8 For example, the FBI classification for 
violent crimes includes homicide, attempted homicide, rape and robbery. Besides having very 
different punishments under any penal code, the number of robberies is generally much higher 
than that of other crimes. We show this for the Brazilian case in which variations in the total 
number of violent crimes is almost exclusively determined by variations in the number of 
robberies.  
Also using Lee and McCrary’s (2017) methodology, Costa et al. (2018) tried to overcome 
this considerable limitation using a proxy variable for the number of crimes: the number of 
homicides by age in Brazil provided by victimization data (death records). According to the 
authors, this variable would overcome the problems caused by the underreporting of crimes. In 
other words, the study assumed that the profile of the criminals would be very similar to that of 
the victims of this type of crime. Faced with possible criticism about the use of this proxy, the 
authors complemented the study by using information about four years of arrests in the state of 
Rio de Janeiro, which were aggregated into four categories (violent index crimes, property 
index crimes, drug-related non-index crimes and other non-index crimes) in accordance with 
their severity. Considering this proxy and the crime aggregations, the authors did not find a 
                                                          
8 Loeffler and Grunwald (2015) evaluated recidivism probability through the quasi-experiment generated by the 
law of the State of Illinois using four-year data from drug felonies in the city of Chicago. The authors found that 
processing juveniles as adults reduced recidivism probability by 3 to 5 percent. Since they used data from a single 
felony that is not usually punished severely for first offenders, their study was not limited by the problems 
generated by the aggregation of crimes or by the presence of incapacitated individuals in the sample. 




significant reduction in the number of homicides or arrests for violent crimes, crimes against 
property or other minor crimes. However, they found a reduction in drug-related crimes.9 
 
3. Institutional background 
 
Similarly to Lee and McCrary (2009), Loeffler and Grunwald (2015) and Costa et al. (2018), 
we use the quasi-experiment generated by the parallel existence of two criminal laws that 
generate discontinuity in punishment severity at 18 years of age. In Brazil, individuals younger 
than 18 are governed by the Statute of the Child and Adolescent, which provides for seven types 
of warning and punishment that last from 0 to 3 years. The most severe punishment is juvenile 
incarceration. In this case, crimes are treated as infractions and, therefore, they do not count as 
cumulative crimes for the individual’s adult life. In other words and as mentioned before, at 18 
years of age all Brazilians are considered first-time defendants. In turn, those older than 18 are 
governed by the Penal Code, which prescribes three punishment regimes (open, semi-open and 
closed), with a duration of 0 to 30 years.10  
Therefore, the existence of these two regimes for the same infraction/crime means that there 
are differences in punishment severity. However, these differences are not the same for all 
crimes. In crimes with lower offensive potential, the punishments tend to be soft or inexistent. 
For example, in the case of theft, it is highly unlikely that incarceration (in a juvenile facility) 
would be applied to minors because this type of measure prioritizes cases involving violence.11 
For this same crime, article 155 of the Penal Code prescribes incarceration from one to four 
years, as well as a fine. However, if the sentence of the convicted person is less than two years, 
this provision may be suspended for two to four years, provided that the convicted person is not 
a reoffender. If the sentence is between two and four years of incarceration, the convicted person 
may serve this sentence under the open regime, again as long as he or she is not a reoffender.12 
We use these types of crime with no large discontinuity in the severity of punishment as a 
placebo. 
In the case of heinous crimes, such as drug trafficking and homicide, the situation of soft 
punishments changes significantly. For these crimes, convicted people must start their sentence 
in the closed regime, and regime progression occurs under more rigid conditions: the 
progression for first-time offenders occurs after 2/5 of the sentence in a closed regime (with 
tougher conditions for reoffenders) while for other crimes it occurs after serving 1/6 of the 
sentence. Table 1 compares the maximum penalties applied to minors with the minimum 
                                                          
9 In addition to the limitation imposed by the use of questionable proxies, the number of homicides and the victims’ 
age, and the grouped data, the study combined the use of a log transformation of the data with nonlinear models 
(polynomials of high order) which made it impossible to know what the estimated coefficients actually mean. 
10 Recently, Law 13,964/2019 raised the maximum penalty to 40 years.  
11According to a survey by the National Socio-Educational Service System from 2016, approximately 3% of 
juvenile incarcerations were due to cases of theft. This same survey showed that almost 66% of incarcerated youths 
are affected by this measure due to infractions against people. The survey can be accessed from the following link: 
http://www.mdh.gov.br/todas-as-noticias/2018/marco/Levantamento_2016Final.pdf (last accessed September 
2020). 
12 A similar situation occurs with other quite frequent crimes, such as assault and threat. These crimes are defined 
in articles 129 and 147 of the Penal Code that prescribes a sentence of imprisonment for three months to a year 
and for one month to six months, respectively. In other words, as for the crime of theft, first-time offenders will 
probably have their sentence suspended or served in the open regime. 




penalties applied to adults to estimate the differences in punishment severity that exist between 
the two legislations (the Statute of the Child and Adolescent and the Penal Code) for these 
crimes. As evidenced, despite juvenile incarceration not being perfectly comparable to adult 
imprisonment, in practice the length of incarceration would be approximately six times higher 
in terms of time served under the Penal Code for both drug trafficking and homicide. 
 
Table 1. Differences in punishment severity, in accordance with Brazilian legislation, for the 
crimes of drug trafficking and homicide. 
    Drug trafficking 
(Art. 33, Law 11,343/2006) 
Qualified homicide 
(Art. 121, Penal Code) 
Statute of the 
Child and 
Adolescent 
(< 18 years) 
Punishment 
prescribed 
0 to 3 years 0 to 3 years 
Progression 
rule 
Summary statement 492 of the 
Superior Court of Justice: there 
is no requirement for 
incarceration in a juvenile 
facility for the first infraction 
No specific rule 
Actual 
punishment 
Only 17% receive sentences of 
incarceration in a juvenile 
facility, which are rarely longer 
than 3 months  
9 months of juvenile 
incarceration 
Penal Code 
(> 18 years) 
Punishment 
prescribed 
Incarceration of 5 to 15 years 
and payment of a 500 to 1,500 
day fine 




2/5 of the sentence 2/5 of the sentence 
Actual 
punishment 
2 years of incarceration13 4.8 years of incarceration 
Note: homicide attempts are the intention to kill but the goal is not achieved. The punishment in the Statute of the 
Child and Adolescent is also 0 to 3 years, with an actual punishment far below the 9 months observed for 
homicides. For adults, the Brazilian Penal Code prescribes a reduction of 1/3 to 2/3 in case of attempt, but even if 
a sentence is cut by the maximum, 2/3, the minimal sentence would be 4 years with at least one year and seven 
months in a closed regime. 
 
A relevant issue is that it cannot be guaranteed, a priori, that the punishment probability is 
the same above and below the age threshold for the crimes we are considering. Arora (2019) 
drew attention to the fact that, in general, there may be a rate of underreporting for underage 
crimes. This situation would lead to an underestimation of the effects of the increase in 
                                                          
13 However, the punishment for first-time offenders may vary according to the judge’s discretion. In addition, an 
offender may serve the sentence in an open regime, since the Brazilian Supreme Court decided that could be a 
possibility if the defendant is caught with a small amount of drugs, has a good background and does not belong to 
a criminal organization. 




punishment severity that occurs with the age of criminal responsibility. In the case of drug 
trafficking, it may be realistic to assume that a certain percentage of crimes are not recorded by 
police officers for either minors or adults due to the insignificance of the amount of drugs 
possessed. One cannot rule out the possibility that there are a priori differences between this 
underestimation. This would result in differences in the likelihood of punishment among minors 
and adults for this type of crime. In the case of drug trafficking one could, in principle, expect 
a possible change in (under)reporting behavior of police officers (with more leniency towards 
minors). Hence, the incentives faced by adults in terms of the probability and severity of 
punishment go in the same direction. In the case of homicides or homicide attempts it is not 
plausible to suppose that police fail to record these crimes, for whatever reason, or reduce their 
effort to arrest suspects if it is determined that the person responsible is a minor (see Lee and 
McCrary, 2017). Thus, in this case, stability is expected in the punishment probability, which 
enables a more accurate estimation of the effects from the change in punishment severity.  
 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
The database used in this study includes all the arrests made by the police (civil and military) 
in the state of Rio de Janeiro during 2016 and the first half of 2017. During this period, 59,117 
total arrests were made, for which there is information about the type of crime and the date it 
occurred, as well as information about the suspects, such as their date of birth, sex, race and 
municipality of origin (see Table A1 in the appendix for the main crime categories). 
As explained, we focus on drug trafficking crimes and homicides (see Figure 1). From a 
statistical point of view, the occurrences of homicides among youngsters aged 17–19 were not 
enough to provide robust estimates in terms of the number of observations. Hence, at the cost 
of losing a clear downward jump at the cut-off age observed for homicides (see Figure A.2 in 
the appendix), we aggregate homicides and homicide attempts to gather enough information to 
estimate the non-parametric models.  
Figure 1 shows that arrests for drug trafficking and homicides (including attempts) peak 
between 16 and 19 years of age. In the histogram, the data is aggregated by year. Behavior 
around 18 years of age may vary and a more formal evaluation is necessary. Potential 
differences in socio-economic characteristics and psychological development mean that these 
groups cannot be treated as equal without proper controls for these differences. The problem is 
that information about these features is rarely available. In this context, a Regression 
Discontinuity Design is a robust methodology that consists of a non-experimental approach in 
which the assignment of treatment of an individual is continuously linked to a measurable 
exogenous variable/characteristic that enables control and treatment groups to be separated 
based on a cut-off. In other words, for our identification strategy of local treatment effects, the 
discontinuity that matters is total arrests by age in the vicinity of 18 years old and not arrests 
aggregated by year of age. 
 
 




Figure 1. Distribution of arrests by age for the crimes of drug trafficking and homicide 
(including attempts) in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2016–2017). 
 
                   (a) Drug trafficking                                 (b) Homicides (including attempts) 
Note: these figures are obtained using as an outcome variable arrests of individuals when they appear for the first 
time in our data set. The figures for each crime independently of the offender, and for adults’ first offense only, 
can be found in Figure A.1 in the appendix.  
 
The application of this method depends on the choice of a continuous classification variable. 
According to Cattaneo et al. (2018), non-parametric methods for estimating local polynomials 
are not applicable when the choice variable is discrete, unless the probability mass points have 
a large amount of information. This problem is evident when the total number of crimes (arrests) 
by age is used. Over the course of a year there are 365 possible dates for individuals to be 
arrested. However, there may be a reasonable number of dates without crimes (i.e., with values 
missing), or there may also be a problem if the number of arrests is not large enough each “day”, 
so that one does not have the information per mass point needed to perform a local polynomial 
estimation.14Alternatively, we use the total number of homicides (including attempts) and drug 
trafficking crimes for a seven-day interval (bin). Even though this empirical strategy implies a 
loss of variability in the data used, it gives us an effective number of observations that is large 
enough to estimate a local polynomial model with good confidence. Thus, the estimated local 
effect of the treatment informs us whether the total number of arrests for homicides/drug 
trafficking increases or decreases with the age of criminal responsibility. 
A necessary requirement to ensure method robustness is for the classification variable not to 
be caused or influenced by the treatment. In our case, it is quite plausible that this requirement 
is satisfied because the individuals included in the sample cannot decide in which group they 
will be because their age (running variable) is defined exogenously. In other words, suspects 
cannot choose to which punishment regime they are subjected, as this is defined by their age, 
over which they have no control. Additionally, it should be assumed that discontinuity at the 
cut-off point is due only to the change in treatment status. The other variables, when there are 
covariates, should show smooth (and continuous) behavior during the observations: there 
                                                          
14 To overcome this problem, Lee and McCrary (2017) used recidivism as an outcome variable instead of total 
number of crimes. That is, the entire sample is used. Zero is assigned to the criminals who did not reoffend and 
one to those who reoffended. Thus, there is a sufficiently large amount of information to treat the age variable 
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should be no differences between individuals near this threshold beyond the receipt or non-
receipt of this treatment.15  
Another sensitive point of this method is the choice of functional forms and bandwidths. 
Information is required on what functional form should be used for the relationship between 
the outcome variable and the classification variable; which information interval in the 
neighborhood should be included in the estimation; and how much information should be 
included in each bin. All of this information is necessary to estimate the non-parametric models. 
In this latter case, there is a trade-off between bias and variance, in which smaller bandwidths 
have a smaller bias. However, a larger bandwidth means greater variance. Thus, several authors 
have proposed methods for obtaining a bandwidth that minimizes both the bias and the variance 
of the estimates (Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012; Calonico et al., 
2014). 
Figure 2. Second-order local polynomial regression of total arrests for the crimes of drug 
trafficking and homicide in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2016–2017. 
  
                                 (a) Drug trafficking                                               (b) Homicides (including attempts)  
Note: these figures are obtained using as an outcome variable arrests of individuals when they appear for the first 
time in our data set. The figures for each crime independently of the offender, and for adults’ first offense only are 
practically identical (not reported but available upon request).  
 
Figure 2 provides a preview of our estimates. It shows non-parametric estimates in a second-
order polynomial for total arrests for drug trafficking and homicides (including attempts). 
Thirty bins are used to the right and to the left throughout the classification variable (age) in an 
interval with one year more and one year less than the cut-off point (18 years of age). The 
identification strategy is based on the separation of arrests into two groups (treatment and 
control) to estimate non-parametric models for each of them, so that they could be extrapolated 
to the cut-off point to simultaneously obtain the values of the treatment group and the control 
group. The difference (at the dashed vertical line) is the local average treatment effect.  
As shown in Figure 2, there is a positive trend in drug trafficking arrests before 18 years of 
age, with a subsequent jump down and change in this trend after the threshold. The confidence 
                                                          
15In this case, there are some characteristics that change in Brazil at 18 years of age. These include emancipation 
of the individual and the right to drive, buy legal drugs and work in activities of any nature. We rely on results 
presented in Costa et al. (2018), who conducted a series of empirical tests to rule out the possibility that their 
estimated treatment effects due to the age of criminal responsibility, as in our case, were due to changes in these 
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intervals for this model are narrow since there are many more observations for this crime than 
for others. The total number of homicides is more disperse, and it is not easy to observe any 
trend or functional form before the estimation. However, a second order polynomial model 
shows an increase starting six months before 18 years, and a significant jump down after 18 
years of age. However, these results should be viewed with caution, given that the estimates do 
not consider the choice of optimal bandwidth. In the present study, the choice of optimal 
bandwidth follows the procedures proposed by Calonico et al. (2014; hereafter CCT), and the 
results presented in the next section follow only these procedures. 
 
5. Results  
 
The results presented in Table 2 (drug trafficking) and Table 3 (homicides including 
attempts) are estimated with two orders of polynomial16 and generally show a significant 
negative treatment effect in all the estimated models. 
In the case of drug trafficking (Table 2), an increase in punishment of incarceration in a 
juvenile facility for a maximum of three months to a minimum prison sentence of five years 
(which may, or may not, be served in the closed regime) reduces the number of arrests by 
between 3.1% and 9.1%. Note that this result should be considered with caution, since there 
could be two forces with opposite signs acting on the total arrests of juveniles that cannot be 
observed. First, we cannot rule out the possibility of underreporting of this crime for juveniles 
as described by Lee and McCrary (2017) and Arora (2019), which reduces the observed total 
arrests below 18 years old. Second, it is very common for juveniles to assume the crime of drug 
trafficking committed by adults because their punishment is very soft compared to that of an 
adult.  
For homicides (including attempts; Table 3), an increase in punishment severity from nine 
months of incarceration in a juvenile facility to at least four years and ten months in a closed 
regime prison reduces total arrests for homicides by between 34.94% and 39.72%. For 
homicides, underreporting is expected to be very low, and the incentive for juveniles to assume 
the crime of homicide committed by adults is lower than for drug trafficking because the 
punishment of juveniles, although it is still lower than that of an adult, it is not close to zero.  
We analyze the robustness of these results by first evaluating the existence of discontinuities 
at other ages close to the cut-off age (Table A.2 for drug trafficking crimes and Table A.3 for 
homicides including attempts, in the appendix). The results indicate that there is no significant 
reduction in the total arrests for drug trafficking and homicide at the ages of 17 or 19 considering 
the three sample arrangements. For homicides, the hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are 
zero could not be rejected, while for drug trafficking the coefficients are positive and significant 
in all linear models. However, most of these positive jumps disappear in non-linear models. 
The only exception is the model that consider only the first offense in our sample, which shows 
                                                          
16 The option to estimate models with two orders of polynomial is justified by the flexibility that is necessary for 
the functional form to avoid the error of interpreting a change that occurs more abruptly than that predicted by a 
linear model as being a discontinuity. However, according to Gelman and Imbens (2019), the use of polynomials 
of an order higher than two is not recommended because these generate estimates with substantial noise and usually 
extrapolate plausible confidence intervals.  




a significant positive jump at the age of 17, probably as a result of the positive trend observed 
in the arrests for drug trafficking before the age of penal majority. 
 
Table 2. Local average treatment effect on the total of arrests and on the percentage of arrests 
















         
1 -3.235*** -4.49% -3.184*** -4.28% -2.295*** -3.12% 
 










       
2 -5.845*** -8.58% -5.944*** -8.74% -6.236*** -9.10% 
 










       
Notes: entries are the local average treatment effects using the CCT to select the bandwidth, with the standard 
errors shown below in parentheses. The values indicated in the bandwidth refer to the intervals below and above 
18 years of age. The first column indicates the order of the polynomial used in the non-parametric estimation. *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
Table 3. Local average treatment effect on the total of arrests and on the percentage of arrests 
















         
1 -1.8432*** -35.03% -1.9772*** -39.72% -1.4294** -34.94% 










       
2 -1.8757*** -37.62% -1.9466*** -39.61% -1.6206** -37.00% 
 










       
Notes: entries are the local average treatment effects using the CCT to select the bandwidth, with the standard 
errors shown below in parentheses. The values indicated in the bandwidth refer to the intervals below and above 
18 years of age. The first column indicates the order of the polynomial used in the non-parametric estimation. *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
 
The second robustness exercise uses other crimes for which there are no large differences in 
punishment severity. Considering all observations, the results for thefts, threats and assaults 
indicate that, as expected, there is no significant reduction in these crimes at the age of criminal 
responsibility (see Table A.4 in the appendix). In fact, in these cases, the punishments were 




very soft or almost inexistent for both groups (treatment and control). However, there is an 
increase in the total number of robberies, which may be an indication that the actual punishment 
severity applied to minors close to 18 years of age for this type of crime may be greater than 
that applied to adults who are “first-time” offenders, as criminal records are deleted when 
individuals turn 18 years of age.17 
Our main results differ somewhat from those obtained by Lee and McCrary (2017) and Costa 
et al. (2018). Regarding the first study, the differences are only in relation to magnitude. There 
are no differences with respect to the sign or significance of the estimated local average 
treatment effects. Regarding the second study, the differences are statistically significant, given 
that the authors did not find significant impacts of the increase in severity of punishment due to 
age of criminal responsibility with regard to violent crimes. However, they found significant 
negative impacts for drug-related crimes, as we do in the present study. 
One possible explanation for the differences in magnitude between this study and that of Lee 
and McCrary (2017) is that both Lee and McCrary (2017) and Costa et al. (2018) grouped 
violent crimes. This empirical strategy may produce misleading conclusions about the 
deterrence effects of increasing punishment severity. This crime is the most common of violent 
crimes (as shown in Figure A.3 of the appendix). Therefore, the non-significant impact of 
violent crimes found by these authors, especially Costa et al. (2018) who used a database similar 
to ours, is the result of aggregating crimes that have quite different numbers of arrests and 
punishment severity.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This article uses a quasi-experiment generated by the age of criminal responsibility in Brazil 
to evaluate the impacts of increased punishment severity on two types of crime: drug trafficking 
and homicides. These crimes were chosen because they have significant differences in 
punishment severity between minors and adults in Brazil and they are closely related to drug 
trafficking gangs in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The results indicated a significant reduction in 
the total number of these crimes with the increase in punishment severity provided for in the 
Penal Code. Therefore, it can be concluded that, in the particular set up of Rio de Janeiro, 
increasing punishment severity would reduce these crimes and would reduce engagement in 
criminal activities. These results differ from studies that used similar methodologies, such as 
Lee and McCrary (2017) and Costa et al. (2018). However, they are in agreement with those of 
other authors such as Kessler and Levitt (1999), Helland and Tabarrok (2007), Drago et al. 
(2007) and Loeffler and Grunwald (2015), who also used robust methods (i.e., based on natural 
experiments and quasi-experiments).  
This empirical study differs from its predecessors by analyzing the crimes in a non-grouped 
manner. This enables more precise estimates of crime elasticities with respect to punishment 
                                                          
17 For robberies, the punishment provided by article 157 of the Brazilian Penal Code is incarceration of four to ten 
years. However, if this punishment is less than eight years and if the defendant is a first-time offender, the sentence 
may be served in the semi-open regime. Therefore, there is no punishment in a closed regime. For minors, the 
punishment of juvenile incarceration for this crime is unlikely to be applied for the first infraction, but when applied 
(for recidivists) in the state of Rio de Janeiro, it is usually for five months of detention in a juvenile facility. So, at 
least for robbery, the punishment severity may be more severe for juveniles than it is for adults, since a detention 
period is more likely to be sentenced for juveniles than for adults.  




severity and the outlining of a counterfactual scenario of what would occur if there were a 
reduction in the age of criminal responsibility for these crimes. The results indicate that an 
increase in the detention period of approximately one year and nine months (or 800%) for drug 
trafficking and four years (or 500%) for homicides, respectively, combined with the more 
inhospitable environment of prisons, can reduce drug trafficking and homicide crimes, 
assuming that there is stability in the percentage of arrests per crime, by approximately 9% and 
37%, respectively. These elasticities appear to be very low considering the required percentage 
increase in the detention period. However, the costs involved may not be as high.  
If instead of completing detention in a prison, the increase in the detention period is served 
in the form of incarceration in a juvenile facility, then each extra year of incarceration would 
cost the state of Rio de Janeiro approximately BRL20,000 per inmate, according to DEGASE 
accounting information. Thus, a four-year increase in the length of incarceration (so that the 
period of detention is equivalent to the minimum stipulated for an adult for homicide) would 
cost approximately BRL80,000 per inmate. If it is considered that 34 minors were arrested in 
2016 for homicide and that each one would result in a cost increase of this amount, it can be 
concluded that the total cost of applying these more severe punishments would be BRL2.72 
million per year. 
However, in this case, there would be no guarantees that the reduction in the number of 
crimes/arrests would occur at the same magnitude as would occur in the event of a reduction in 
the age of criminal responsibility. It should be emphasized that the results obtained in this study 
refer to a composition of time and type of punishment. In addition to differences in time 
detained, incarceration in a juvenile facility is qualitatively different from an adult prison. 
Nevertheless, these limitations do not prevent conjecture regarding some scenarios that enable 
evaluation of the benefits and costs of implementing this measure. If the more conservative 
estimate by Pereira et al. (2020) of BRL3.78 million18 for the value of statistical life in Brazil 
is accounted for, the benefit of applying this new punishment would exceed its costs by almost 
BRL1 million if only one life was saved. So, this measure would be worthwhile even without 
accounting for the benefit of preventing a juvenile from starting a criminal career in a drug 
trafficking gang of Rio de Janeiro.  
In the case of reducing the age of criminal responsibility (i.e., serving this additional period 
in prisons), the estimated costs would be similar: approximately BRL22,000 per additional year 
of detention, with a total cost (approximately BRL2.992 million) that is still lower than the 
statistical value of one life. However, the costs of punishing a child or adolescent as an adult 
can be added to these costs. These costs involve the psychological damage caused to these 
minors due to their presence in an unhealthier and more dangerous environment, including a 
higher risk of death. Even if these additional costs are not considered, it cannot be ignored that 
this type of measure can lead to a proportional reduction in the likelihood of punishment 
because judges may become aware of the adverse situation experienced by these children and 
adolescents and, therefore, reduce the number of convictions, as suggested by Andreoni (1991).  
However, regardless of these aspects, it must be emphasized that the results obtained in this 
study indicate that the most severe punishment provided for by the Penal Code leads to a 
                                                          
18 These values are estimated based on the risks involved in employment activity. Thus, each worker has a value 
of his or her life calculated according to their willingness to accept risks. In a model with fixed effects, the values 
of statistical life estimated for Brazil vary between BRL3.78 million and BRL4.69 million.  




reduction in the total number of arrests for the crime of homicide. Assuming that there is 
stability in the percentage of arrests per crime, there would also be a reduction in the number 
of arrests (which would further reduce the cost of applying the measure) and in the number of 
homicides (which would increase the benefits of the measure), due to the deterrence effects of 
this more severe punishment. Therefore, even in the most pessimistic scenario, some lives are 
expected to be saved and some criminal careers interrupted, so that the benefits far outweigh 
the costs of applying more severe punishments to minors in the case of homicides, regardless 
of the method of application, whether in the form of incarceration in a juvenile facility or an 
adult prison.  
This net benefit observed in the case of homicides is most likely not observed in the case of 
drug trafficking. This difference is probably because, besides the low impact of the harsher 
punishments imposed by the age of criminal responsibility on the total arrests for this crime (a 
reduction of approximately 9%), it is unlikely that arrests for drug trafficking will lead to a 
reduction in the occurrence of this type of crime because detained criminals are quickly and 
easily replaced by others. In this context, an increase in punishment severity suggests a higher 
cost for potential criminals, who in turn will have to be compensated financially for this higher 
expected cost. Thus, recruiters of juveniles will have to spend more resources on the drug 
trafficking workforce. It is possible that equalizing punishment severity between minors and 
adults will reduce the number of juveniles involved in this type of crime, which would help 
solve the problem that clearly exists in the state of Rio de Janeiro regarding the use of minors 
as sellers and soldiers for drug trafficking. However, it cannot be ignored that there are 
psychological differences that make youngster (minors) more prone to crime. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that only increases in punishment severity can deter youngsters from 
crime, particularly a crime with high financial returns, as is the case with drug trafficking. There 
is evidence of public policies that are more effective in achieving this objective and are applied 
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Table A.1. Total arrests by type of crime in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2016–2017). 
Crime type # % 
Assault 2,365 4.0% 
Drug trafficking 33,570 56.8% 
Extortion  109 0.2% 
Homicides + attempts 1,608 2.7% 
Rape 249 0.4% 
Robbery 12,191 20.6% 
Swindle 277 0.5% 
Theft 7,433 12.6% 
Threat 1,315 2.2% 
Total 59,117  
 
 
Figure A.1. Distribution of arrests by age for the crimes of drug trafficking and homicide 
(including attempts) in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2016–2017). 
 
        (a) Drug trafficking (all observations)                                 (b) Homicides + attempts (all observations)     
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Figure A.2. Distribution of arrests by age for the crime of homicide (not including attempts) in 
the state of Rio de Janeiro, for 2016–2017. 
 
Note: figure obtained using as the outcome variable arrests of individuals when they appear for the first time in 
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Table A.2. Falsification tests: drug trafficking. 
Polynomial 
order 





        
1 17 2.7199*** 3.9318*** 2.6323*** 
 
 
(0.4263) (0.4192) (0.4784) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.328 0.269 0.326 
  (3.9 months) (3.1 months) (3.9 months) 
     
2 17 0.5431 0.8644 4.6775*** 
  (0.7212) (0.7186) (0.8125) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.178 0.182 0.201 
  (2.1 months) (2.1 months) (2.4 months) 
     
1 19 3.8332*** 2.858*** 2.8588*** 
  (0.4284) (0.4875) (0.4876) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.092 0.097 0.097 
  (1.1 months) (1.1 months) (1.1 months) 
     
2 19 0.7801 -0.0611 0.1578 
  (0.4767) (0.5148) (0.5264) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.195 0.213 0.202 
  (2.3 months) (2.5 months) (2.4 months) 
Notes: entries are the local average treatment effects using the CCT method to select the bandwidth, with the 
standard errors shown below in parentheses. The values indicated in the bandwidth refer to the intervals below and 
above the age shown in the first column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  




Table A.3. Falsification tests: homicides (including attempts). 
Polynomial 
order 





        
1 17 1.0972 1.1892 1.0779 
 
 
(0.7959) (0.8269) (0.9169) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.474 0.443 0.543 
  (5.7 months) (5.3 months) (6.5 months) 
     
2 17 0.7476 0.7727 0.9845 
  (0.8865) (0.9010) (1.1169) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.812 0.793 0.799 
  (9.7 months) (9.5 months) (9.5 months) 
     
1 19 -0.0263 0.0021 -0.0831 
  (0.5256) (0.5243) (0.5114) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.561 0.666 0.656 
  (6.7 months) (8 months) (8 months) 
     
2 19 -0.2484 0.6121 0.9931 
  (0.7685) (0.7726) (0.929) 
 Bandwidth (h) 0.619 0.613 0.575 
  (7.4 months) (7.3 months) (6.9 months) 
Notes: entries are the local average treatment effects using the CCT method to select the bandwidth, with the 
standard errors shown below in parentheses. The values indicated in the bandwidth refer to the intervals below and 
above the age shown in the first column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A.4. Local average treatment effect on the total arrests for thefts, robberies, threats and 
assaults (all observations). 
Polynomial order Robberies Thefts Threats Assaults 
        
1 4.7645*** 0.6625 -0.3398 0.6279 
  (0.3011) (0.4770) (0.0.3277) (0.5540) 
Bandwidth (h) 0.343 0.354 0.508 0.620 
 (4.1 months) (4.2 months) (6 months) (7.4 months) 
     
2 6.2137*** 0.5495 -0.5308 0.7431  
(0.3163) (0.4464) (0.3886) (0.6639) 
Bandwidth (h) 0.415 0.710 0.633 0.976 
 (5 months) (8.5 months) (7.6 months) (11.7 months) 
Notes: entries are the local average treatment effects using the CCT method to select the bandwidth, with the 
standard errors shown below in parentheses. The values indicated in the bandwidth refer to the intervals below and 
above 18 years of age. The first column indicates the order of the polynomial used in the non-parametric 
estimation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  





Figure A.3. Distribution of arrests by violent crimes (homicides, robberies, aggravated assault 
and rapes) and robberies by age in the state of Rio de Janeiro (2016–2017). 
 
Note: figure obtained using as the outcome variable arrests of individuals when they appear for the first time in 
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